

**IN THE MATTER OF**

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**BEFORE THE**

**MATTHEW BATHULA,**

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**MARYLAND BOARD**

**RESPONDENT-Pharmacist**

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**OF PHARMACY**

**LICENSE NO.: 18771**

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**Case No.: 25-205**

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**INTERIM ORDER OF SUMMARY SUSPENSION**

On May 15, 2025, the Maryland State Board of Pharmacy (the “Board”) notified MATTHEW BATHULA (the “Respondent”), License Number 18771, of the Board’s intent to summarily suspend the Respondent’s license to practice pharmacy in the State of Maryland. On June 11, 2025, the Board held a pre-deprivation show cause hearing to consider whether to summarily suspend the Respondent’s license. At the conclusion of the pre-deprivation show cause hearing, the Board voted to issue this Interim Order pursuant to its authority under Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-226(c)(2) and COMAR 10.34.01.12, concluding that the public health, safety or welfare requires emergency action in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein. This Order is based on the following preliminary findings, which the Board has reason to believe are true:

**PRELIMINARY FINDINGS**

Based on information received by, and made known to the Board, and the investigatory information obtained by, received by and made known to and available to

the Board, including the instances described below, the Board has reason to believe that the following facts are true:

1. On or about June 24, 2008, the Respondent was originally licensed to practice as a pharmacist in the State of Maryland. The Respondent's license expires on September 30, 2025.
2. At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent was employed as a pharmacist at a Hospital in Maryland (the "Hospital").<sup>1</sup>
3. On or about January 3, 2025, the Board received a complaint (the "Complaint") from the Hospital.
4. The Complaint alleges that the Respondent was employed as a Clinical Pharmacy Specialist at a clinic within the Hospital from July 8, 2011 until his termination on October 3, 2024.
5. According to the Complaint, in July 2024, the Hospital discovered that someone had gained unauthorized access to several employees' email mailboxes. A subsequent investigation determined that the Respondent used sophisticated data collection methods to access the Hospital employees' personal and professional accounts and obtained their personal data, photos and videos.
6. On May 9, 2025, the Board's investigator interviewed two Hospital security officials who stated that they became aware of "suspicious activity" through

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<sup>1</sup> For confidentiality and privacy purposes, the names of individuals and facilities involved in this case are not disclosed in this document.

collaboration with the IT security team and the school affiliated with the hospital. According to the security officials, the suspicious activity involved email accounts which had automated “rules” deleting certain emails without the account holder’s knowledge. According to the security officials, the Hospital retained a cyber-security firm, CrowdStrike, who identified files that were being saved to a USB drive in real time. Security officials connected online activity, system activity, security-badge activity, and physical location to identify a suspect. On or about September 28 or 29, 2024, the Hospital determined the Respondent was responsible for the security violations.

7. The Board obtained CrowdStrike’s Interim Investigation Summary Report. According to the Interim Report, the Hospital engaged CrowdStrike “to investigate a business email compromise involving the creation of suspicious mail rules within the mailboxes of eight [Hospital] user accounts by an unauthorized third party. . . . CrowdStrike identified evidence that these suspicious mail rules originated from the [Hospital], and was further engaged to conduct a wide scale incident response and forensics investigation.” CrowdStrike determined that the earliest date of confirmed threat actor activity occurred on April 1, 2021. The threat actor employed various techniques to gain access to individuals’ personal and professional email accounts, photos and likely their social media accounts.
8. On or about March 27, 2025, a class action lawsuit was filed against the Hospital (Baltimore City Circuit Court Case No. C-24-CV-25-002505) alleging that over a ten-year period, the Respondent installed spyware on at least 400 computers at the

Hospital. The Respondent then remotely accessed webcams to record female colleagues breastfeeding their babies, interacting with children and having sex in the privacy of their homes.

9. The class action plaintiffs allege that the Respondent accessed and retained the plaintiffs' personal data, photographs and videos. The plaintiffs further allege that the Respondent also remotely accessed webcams at the computer stations in closed treatment rooms to record videos of doctors pumping breastmilk.
10. According to the class action civil complaint, the Respondent had access to hundreds of stationary computer stations within the Hospital, rooms where laptops were stored and computer stations equipped with webcams in private patient-exam rooms. The Respondent used his electronic access privileges to install keyloggers on Hospital computers which captured the usernames and passwords entered and sent them to the Respondent. The keylogger also collected their personal usernames and passwords and sent them to the Respondent. The Respondent maintained a list of usernames and credentials which he used to access the plaintiffs' personal accounts where he downloaded and retained photographs, videos, and other personal information.

### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

Based upon the foregoing Preliminary Findings, the Board concludes as a matter of law that the public health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action,

pursuant to Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-226(c)(2) and Md. Code Regs.

("COMAR") 10.34.01.12E.

### **ORDER**

Based on the foregoing, and after a Show Cause Hearing was held in which the Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard as to whether a Summary Suspension should be executed, on this 12<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2025, by an affirmative vote of the Board, it is hereby,

**ORDERED** that pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 10-226(c)(2) and COMAR10.34.01.12G(1), the Respondent's license, Number 18771, to practice pharmacy in the State of Maryland is hereby **SUMMARILY SUSPENDED** until such time that: (1) the Respondent's pending criminal proceedings related to this matter are resolved; and, (2) the Respondent petitions the Board for a show cause hearing to reconsider the continuation of this summary suspension; and it is further

**ORDERED** that the Respondent has the right to request an evidentiary hearing on the merits of this summary suspension of the Respondent's license. The request for an evidentiary hearing must be in writing and be filed with the Board **within thirty (30) days** from the date of this Order; and it is further


**ORDERED** that if the Respondent files a timely written request for an evidentiary hearing on the summary suspension, the Board shall schedule an evidentiary hearing within a reasonable time and duly notify the Respondent; and it is further

**ORDERED** that upon service of this Interim Order of Summary Suspension, the Respondent shall immediately surrender to the Board all indicia of licensure to practice

as a pharmacist in the State of Maryland issued by the Board that are in his possession, including but not limited to its original license and any renewal certificates; and it is further

**ORDERED** that this is a formal order of the Board, and as such, is a **PUBLIC DOCUMENT** in accordance with Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provision §§ 4-101 *et seq.*

6-12-25  
Date

  
Deena Speights-Napata, M.A.  
Executive Director  
Maryland State Board of Pharmacy